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Place-Based Consequences
of Person-Based Transfers
Brad J. Hershbein 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Local labor markets that lose 
greater shares of employment 
during recessions suffer 
persistent relative decreases in 
earnings per capita.
 
n The social safety net 
responds, and areas with 5 
percent greater employment 
losses experience per-capita 
government transfers 2.5 
percent higher even a 
decade later.
n These transfers replace about 
25 percent of lost earnings in 
the long term, and much 
of this is through retirement 
and disability (Social Security) 
or health (Medicare 
and Medicaid).
n The social safety net thus 
helps affected places as 
well as people, but the long-
term assistance does little 
to help with needed skills 
development or job creation.
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Economic Costs and 
Benefits of Tuition-Free 
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As the nation continues to recover from the 
economic recession caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic, Congress continues to debate 
how to extend the social safety net, even afer 
unprecedented (and temporary) responses over 
the past 18 months. An important part of the 
debate is whether government assistance should 
expand beyond what is traditionally thought of as 
social insurance—transfers like the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, also known 
as food stamps), Temporary Assistance to Needy 
families (TANF), and unemployment insurance 
(UI)—to also cover programs that increase skills 
development, such as employment training and 
tuition-free community college. Tis matters 
because previous research has shown that areas 
that were particularly hard hit during a recession 
can sufer long-lasting declines in employment 
rates and per-capita earnings relative to areas that 
escaped the recession unscathed (Hershbein and 
Stuart 2020). With parts of the country heavily 
reliant on tourism still lagging behind in their 
economic recovery, it is an open question how 
well the social safety net—or government transfers 
more generally—respond to recessions not just 
in the short term but over longer horizons as 
well. If transfers remain elevated persistently, 
then places that experience only mild recessions 
implicitly subsidize through the tax code places 
that experience bad recessions, even as economic 
opportunity remains depressed in these latter 
places. 
In forthcoming work, my coauthor Bryan 
A. Stuart and I examine the response of the 
social safety net to place-specifc shifs in 
economic activity arising from recessions over 
the past 50 years. Drawing on annual data we 
have harmonized for 363 metropolitan areas, 
we estimate how average receipt of diferent 
government transfer programs, on a per-capita 
basis, evolve for up to a decade afer each of the 
fve recessions between the 1970s and the Great 
Recession. (We cannot yet investigate the COVID 
recession.) 
We fnd that person-based transfer programs 
generate a substantial amount of place-based re-
distribution. Metropolitan areas that experience 
more severe employment losses during a recession 
face lasting reductions in employment and 
A typically-sized metro of
260,000 people that sufers a worse
recession will receive over half a
billion dollars more in transfers over
the next decade. 
earnings per capita, but they also receive lasting 
increases in transfers per capita. Our estimates 
imply that a metro area experiencing a 5 percent 
greater employment loss during the recession has 
total transfers per capita 2.5 percent higher nearly 
a decade afer the recession ended. For a metro 
area of typical size, about 260,000 residents, this 
translates into more than half a billion dollars of 
transfers over this time period. Moreover, most of 
these transfers are not from what we think of as 
either employment-related social insurance or the 
traditional safety net of means-tested programs. 
Although the former (UI) does respond in the 
short term, the increase fades away relatively 
quickly; the latter safety net programs show a 
more sustained rise, but they are relatively small, 
accounting for only a tenth of total transfers. 
Instead, large entitlement programs including 
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid continue 
to grow afer a recession and account for nearly all 
of the long-term increase. Education and training 
programs, which might help boost skills and future 
earnings, barely respond at all. 
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Place-Based Consequences of Person-Based Transfers 
during the recession. We separately 
analyze fve national recessions: those 
in 1973–1975, 1980–1982 (we combine 
1980 and 1982 in this “double-dip” 
recession), 1990–1991, 2001, and 
2007–2009. Our approach assumes that 
the path of per-capita transfers would 
have evolved similarly between areas 
in the absence of difering recession 
severity. To make this assumption 
more plausible, we control for several 
characteristics of the metro areas. 
Tese include pre-recession population 
growth for diferent age groups to 
control for demographic diferences 
and (nine) census division indicators 
so that we are implicitly comparing 
metro areas within the same division 
of the country. In both of these cases, 
we allow these controls to vary by 
each year we observe transfers, thus 
controlling for age dynamics (such as 
the diferential aging of the population) 
and gradual shifs in economic 
activity, such as the rise of the sunbelt. 
We further control for metro area 
characteristics that don’t vary over 
time, so our results capture changes 
relative to a metro’s own pre-recession 
path, vis-à-vis the changes in another 
metro that difered in recession 
intensity. 
Results 
Figure 2 shows how per-capita 
transfers respond in metros with a 
1 percent greater employment loss 
during the respective recession. Te 
horizontal axis measures years since 
the recession ends (more specifcally, 
when national employment bottomed 
out; recessions typically begin two 
years earlier). Tus, the lef-most part 
of the fgure shows the period before 
the recession begins. Tat values are 
close to zero indicates that diferences 
in transfers between areas that will 
experience severe recessions and those 
that will experience mild recessions 
are small before the recession begins, 
in line with expectations. Once the 
recession begins, however, transfers 
Government Transfers in the 
United States 
Te United States transfers 
considerable sums of money to 
individuals through various programs. 
As of 2017, and across 363 metro areas 
accounting for more than 80 percent 
Total transfers replace about one-ffth
of lost earnings soon after the
Great Recession ended in 2009, but
this share rises over time. 
of the total population, per-person 
transfers averaged nearly $8,300 
annually. Tis represents a quadrupling 
since 1970, even afer adjusting for 
infation, and over 15 percent of 
average income. As shown in Figure 
1, much of these transfers consist of 
retirement and disability insurance— 
Social Security, essentially—and 
medical programs including Medicare 
and Medicaid. Te latter category has 







grown especially quickly, becoming 
the largest category around 2000 and 
today consisting of almost half of total 
transfers. By comparison, income 
maintenance or means-tested programs 
(primarily TANF and its predecessor, 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, SNAP, 
and Supplemental Security Income) 
equal about 10 percent of total transfers 
on average. Unemployment insurance 
is much smaller on average, though it 
tends to rise afer recessions and job 
losses. Transfers for veterans (pensions 
and VA coverage) and education and 
training (Pell Grants and workforce 
training) are quite small on the whole, 
in part because their coverage is much 
more limited than the other programs. 
Our Analysis 
To investigate how employment 
losses during a recession afect per-
capita transfers, we compare how these 
transfers evolve each year between 
metro areas that experienced diferent-
sized employment changes, or shocks, 
Total transfers Retirement and DI 
Medical Income maint. 
UI Veterans 
Educ and training 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
NOTE: The fgure reports national annual totals, per person, of diferent government transfers by category across 
363 metropolitan areas (CBSAs), together accounting for about 80 percent of the U.S. population. Amounts are in 
dollars per person, infation-adjusted to 2017. 
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data. 
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rise sharply, and reach a value of about 
0.5 by recession’s end; this means 
that a 1 percent greater loss in metro 
employment during the recession 
implies a 0.5 percent greater increase 
in per-capita transfers. Moreover, even 
afer the recession is over, each line 
stays elevated above zero and some 
even continue to grow. Terefore, even 
a decade later transfers are higher in 
metro areas that experienced a more 
severe recession: across recessions, a 
5 percent greater recession-induced 
employment loss on average implies 2.5 
percent greater transfers per person. 
How much of the persistent loss in 
per-capita earnings do these transfers 
replace, and which types of transfers 
account for this sustained rise? We 
address these questions for the Great 
Recession in Figure 3. Total transfers 
replace about one-ffh of lost earnings 
soon afer the Great Recession ended 
in 2009, but this share rises over time 
(partly because earnings also somewhat 
recover over time while transfers stay 
about the same). By 2017, eight years 
afer the recession’s end, transfers 
replace about 60 percent of earnings 
losses that year. (Te pattern varies 
somewhat for previous recessions, but 
the replacement share tends to rise over 
time.) Figure 3 also shows that while UI 
shows a slight bump near the end of the 
recession, the efect fades, and medical 
and retirement and disability programs 
(Medicare, Medicaid, and Social 
Security) account for the vast majority 
of the long-term rise. Other programs, 
including traditional safety net ones, 
contribute less, especially over time. 
Discussion and Implications 
Tese results paint a nuanced 
picture of the response of the safety 
net. Programs that receive the 
greatest attention in discussions 
of countercyclical policy—such as 
unemployment insurance, TANF, and 
SNAP—play little role in ofsetting 
the long-run relative earnings losses 
in metro areas that experience more 
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NOTE: The fgure reports estimates of the impact of a 1 percent greater employment loss on the percent 
change in per-capita transfers for the years surrounding a recession, for each of fve recession. The vertical 
black line at 0 indicates the end of the recession—when employment has bottomed out; thus, positive 
numbers on the horizontal axis indicate years since the recession ended while negative numbers count 
backwards (most recessions begin at t−2). A value of 0.5 on the vertical axis means that a 1 percent greater 
employment loss results in a 0.5 percent greater increase in per-capita transfers. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and other data. 










Total transfers Retirement and DI 
Medical Income maint. 
UI Veterans 
Educ and training 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
NOTE: The fgure reports how the increased transfers from Figure 2 compare to losses in per-capita earnings 
by year and transfer type. For example, in 2010 the increase in total transfers from a 1 percent greater 
recession-induced employment loss replaced about 20 percent of per-capita earnings losses that year from 
the same recession-induced employment loss. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and other data. 
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Place-Based Consequences
of Person-Based Transfers 
severe recessions. On the other hand, 
programs such as Social Security 
retirement, Disability Insurance, 
Medicare, and Medicaid partially 
insure areas against the longer-term 
efects of recessions. On average, 
transfers ofset 25 percent of the 
decline in earnings in metro areas hit 
harder by recessions. Furthermore, 
federal transfers that are nominally 
person-based provide implicit, 
persistent, and underappreciated 
geographic transfers from 
economically more successful places 
to economically less successful places. 
Because the long-run 
consequences of recessions on local 
labor markets are not yet widely 
appreciated, there has been little 
discussion of whether the existing 
structure of the social safety net 
constitutes an appropriate policy 
response, not just for individuals 
but for communities as a whole. 
An important direction for future 
research is to study how nominally 
person-based transfers interact 
with place-based policies, such as 
economic development block grants 
and place-based scholarships, in 
afecting efciency and equity of 
the overall system of government 
transfers. One important takeaway 
from our results is that the most 
responsive transfer programs in 
the current system are unlikely 
to encourage labor supply, skill 
development, or job creation, which 
could be essential factors in helping 
hard-hit metro areas from falling 
behind economically. 
Why should states invest in free 
college for their residents? With returns 
to college degrees high and most new 
jobs requiring a postsecondary degree 
or credential, individual motivations 
for college-going are easy to discern. 
As more states create free-college 
pathways for their residents—and as 
more will be asked to do so if the Biden 
administration’s tuition-free college 
plan becomes law—policymakers 
should recognize that free college also 
generates substantial economic and 
fscal returns for the state. 
Tis article presents research 
fndings on the economic and fscal 
impacts from a hypothetical tuition-
free college program in Illinois. Te 
research was carried out with fnancial 
support from the Joyce Foundation 
and the cooperation of the Governor’s 
Ofce of the State of Illinois. More 
information on how these fndings 
were generated can be found in our 
cost estimate and economic benefts
reports to the state. 
Economic returns to free college 
come in the form of higher earnings 
for workers with degrees and spillover 
benefts for other residents. Fiscal 
returns occur when projected tax 
Reference 
Hershbein, Brad J., and Bryan A. 
Stuart. 2020. “Te Enduring Local Harm 
from Recessions.” Upjohn Institute Policy 
Brief. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn 
Institute. https://research.upjohn.org/ 
up_policybriefs/25/. 
Brad J. Hershbein is a senior economist and




College in Illinois 
Timothy J. Bartik, Michelle Miller-Adams, Brian Pittelko, and Bridget Timmeney 
revenues exceed the cost of a free-
college program. Of course, there are 
many other benefts to increasing 
educational attainment. Employers 
have access to a better-trained 
workforce, which spurs innovation 
and productivity. Higher educational 
attainment can also reduce crime and 
substance abuse, help create more 
stable families, and lead to better 
outcomes for the children of college 
graduates. Tese impacts, however, are 
hard to quantify, so we focus here on 
the direct earnings efects for graduates 
and spillover efects for other residents. 
For this project, we modeled two 
versions of tuition-free college: one 
model covers the community college 
sector only and the other includes 
both two-year and four-year public 
institutions. Both adopt a last-dollar 
structure in which a student’s Pell 
Grants are used frst, with the state 
grant closing any remaining gap in 
tuition and fees.1 
A free-tuition program in Illinois 
would generate economic and fscal 
benefts that far exceed its costs, 
although the fscal benefts would 
not be realized immediately. Te less 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Free college generates substantial economic and fiscal returns for the state.
n The combined two-year and four-year program, run for just the years 2021–2030, 
would increase Illinois residents’ total earnings by $44.7 billion.
n We find that a two-year degree yields earnings gains per individual of between 
$154,000 and $182,000 over their lifetime, while a four-year degree yields an earnings 
gain of between $671,000 and $793,000. 
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Table 1  Aggregate Illinois Present Value of Increased Earnings for Tuition Subsidy Programs expensive program covering only 
two-year college yields positive returns 
more quickly, but the returns are not as 
high as they are for the more expansive 
(and expensive) program. 
Free college leads to more college
graduates. Depending on its structure,
tuition-free college will lead more
Illinois residents to complete either a
two-year program, earning an associate
degree, or a four-year program, earning
a bachelor’s degree. Some of these
additional graduates will remain in the
state. (Our analysis focused only on the
higher earnings of graduates who remain
in the state. Graduates leaving the state
are also better of because of the program,
but we are assessing the impact of such
a program on the state and thus do not
account for benefts to out-migrants.)
People with college degrees or
credentials will earn more. Higher
degree completion will signifcantly
increase graduates’ lifetime earnings.
Tis earnings increase is due to these
graduates’ higher skills. In our analysis,
we focus on the earnings efects for
Illinois residents ages 25–79 who remain
in state for their entire careers. We fnd
that a two-year degree yields earnings
gains per individual of between $154,000
and $182,000 over their lifetime, while a
four-year degree yields an earnings gain
of between $671,000 and $793,000. Based
on the research literature, we estimate
spillover efects on other Illinois residents
at 86 percent of the direct efect.
We conclude that the combined
two-year and four-year program, run
for just the years 2021–2030, would
increase Illinois residents’ total earnings
on aggregate by $44.7 billion (in 2021
dollars; see Table 1). Tis is mostly
due to more Illinois residents earning
bachelor’s degrees. Te earnings gain
from the added bachelor’s degrees is
$39.7 billion, versus $5.0 billion from the
added associate degrees. Te greater efect
from the bachelor’s degrees is due to the
much greater annual earnings efects of
such degrees. Te two-year-only tuition
Run from 2021 to 2030  
Direct earnings efect on 
Illinois graduates who stay 
in Illinois, summed over all 
graduates considered in 
cost estimates 
Spillover earnings increase 2,314,636,375 18,369,993,950 3,728,391,768 
for other Illinois workers 
(86% of direct efect) 
Total efect 5,006,074,021 39,730,452,031 8,063,731,033 
Total efect of combined 
two-year and four-year 
program 
Combined two-year and four-year program Two-year program only 
Efect in combined 
program due to two-
year degrees ($) 
2,691,437,646 
44,736,526,052 
subsidy program also has considerable
total earnings benefts. Such a program
run from 2021 through 2030 would
increase the present value of Illinois
residents’ total earnings by $8.1 billion.
How does this compare with the costs
of operating either of these two tuition
subsidy programs from 2021 to 2030?
Based on our modeling, a last-dollar,
community college–only program would
cost $30 million in its frst year, with
annual costs rising to $58 million by the
end of the forecast period. A last-dollar
program covering both two-year and
four-year public in-state institutions
would cost $155 million in its frst year,
with annual costs rising to $615 million
Efect in combined Efect in two-year-only 
program due to four- program due to two-
year degrees ($) year degrees ($) 
21,360,458,081 4,335,339,265 
in 2030. Present value costs and benefts
of the program operated over 10 years,
beginning in 2021, are presented in
Table 2.
Te present value of total earnings
benefts from operating either of these
two programs far exceeds their costs.
For the combined four-year/two-year
program, the present value of total
earnings benefts, at $44.7 billion, is
over 11 times the present value of costs
of around $4 billion. For the two-year-
only program, the present value of total
earnings benefts, at a little over $8 billion,
is more than 18 times the present value of
program costs of $438 million.
Table 2  Aggregate Illinois Present Value Costs and Benefts of Tuition-Free College Programs 
Run from 2021 to 2030 
Combined two-year and Two-year program only 
four-year program ($) ($) 
Present value of costs in 2021 dollars 3,978,294,564 438,274,379 
Present value of direct and spillover earnings 44,736,526,052 8,063,731,033 
benefts for Illinois residents 
Extra state and local tax revenue (earnings 4,755,492,719 857,174,609 
benefts times 10.63%) 
Extra state tax revenue (earnings benefts 2,451,561,628 441,892,461 
times 5.48%) 
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State residents without college 
degrees will earn more, too. When a 
larger share of a state’s residents has a 
college degree, those without a degree 
Earnings gains for other Illinois 
residents—those who do not get the 
higher educational attainment due 
to the tuition subsidy program—are 
much greater than program costs. 
also beneft. Higher wages for educated 
workers push wages up more generally. 
A state with more skilled workers will be 
better able to attract and grow jobs and 
businesses, which will increase the wages 
of all the state’s workers. Finally, a state 
with more skilled workers may develop 
better amenities, public services, social 
services, and community well-being, all 
of which may enhance child development 
and enhance the long-run earnings of the 
next generation. 
Our modeling shows that the earnings 
gains for other Illinois residents—those 
who do not get the higher educational 
attainment due to the tuition subsidy 
program—are much greater than 
program costs. For the combined two-
year/four-year program, spillover benefts 
for other workers are over $20 billion, 
which is far greater than program costs of 
somewhat less than $4 billion. Similarly, 
for the tuition subsidies limited to two-
year programs, the spillover benefts for 
other workers are about $4 billion, which 
far exceeds program costs of a little over 
$400 million. In response to the question 
“Why should Illinois residents pay tuition 
subsidies that directly beneft other 
Illinois residents?”, one answer is that such 
subsidies will increase overall earnings of 
many Illinois workers, not just those who 
get the tuition support. 
States will collect more money in 
taxes than the cost of a free-college 
program—but not right away. Free-
college programs can also be judged by 
whether their fscal benefts outweigh 
their costs. Fiscal benefts come from 
increased tax revenue as workers’ 
earnings rise. We model these benefts 
based on conservative assumptions that 
estimate a lower bound to their value. 

































































2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Total state and local revenue benefit State revenue only benefit Cost 
6 
For a combined two-year and four-
year program, run from 2021 to 2030,
the present value of total state and local
revenue collections will be slightly under
$4.8 billion, which exceeds the present
value of program costs of around $4.0
billion. For the tuition subsidy program
for only two-year degrees, running from
2021 to 2030, the present value of state
and local revenue collections will be
almost $860 million, compared to the
present value of program costs of almost
$440 million.
Te following fgures show a
simulation of annual costs and fscal
benefts for a free-college program that
continues indefnitely.
As Figure 1 shows, the program
starts out with large annual costs, rapidly
increasing to around $500 million
per year in 2021 dollars. Annual fscal
benefts are far less because our earnings
measures do not start counting earnings
efects until graduates reach age 25, and
even afer that it takes many years before
graduates reach their peak earnings
years in their forties and early ffies. As a
result, from a total state and local revenue
standpoint, annual added revenue
collected does not exceed annual tuition
subsidy program costs until the year 2044,
where the state and local revenue line
crosses the cost line. From a state revenue
only line, annual revenue exceeds costs in
the year 2055, where the state revenue line
crosses the cost line. However, in either
case, on an annual basis, this combined
program does eventually generate
sufcient revenue that annual revenue for
just the state exceeds program costs.
Annual fscal benefts and costs of
a community college–only program
from 2021 through 2099 are shown in
Figure 2. Te fscal results of this more
limited program difer from the more
comprehensive program in two ways.
First, the annual costs and benefts are
much lower, so the short-run net fscal
costs are less, as are the long-run net
fscal benefts. Second, the “crossover”
year is fve years earlier. For this cheaper
program, state and local fscal benefts
exceed costs as of 2039, whereas the
EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH  • OCTOBER 2021 W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE 
combined two-year and four-year 
program doesn’t have such benefts 
exceeding costs until 2044. For state 
revenue only, this cheaper program has 
fscal benefts exceeding costs by 2050, 
compared to 2055 for the more expensive 
combined program. 
Overall, in considering these two 
programs’ economic and fscal benefts 
versus costs, two things stand out. First, 
for either tuition subsidy program, the 
true cost-beneft picture does not emerge 
until at least 50 years have passed and an 
entire generation has gained educational 
degrees and completed their working 
careers. Educational investments are 
long-term investments and cannot be 
evaluated properly without considering 
very long-run efects. Second, the 
cheaper, two-year-only program has 
somewhat higher ratios of benefts to 
costs, but the combined program has a 
much higher level of net benefts. 
In sum, an investment by the state 
in either a two-year-only or a two-year 
and four-year combined tuition subsidy 
program will yield benefts far beyond 
the costs of either program, although 
not immediately. Tese benefts result 
from enhanced earnings by degree 
recipients and large spillover efects for 
those without degrees. A sufcient share 
of this increased income will be paid 
to Illinois state and local governments, 
and eventually annual fscal benefts will 
exceed these tuition subsidy programs’ 
costs. 
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Tere are political challenges to
investing state resources in a program
that does not yield fscal returns until
decades later; however, the economic
benefts of free college to a state’s workers
and employers begin almost immediately.
Tis is the grounds on which many states
have—and more states should—launch
their free-college efort.
Note 
1. Tis is not an ideal structure from an 
equity standpoint because non-Pell-eligible 
students receive more state funding than 
Pell-eligible students who may then still 
struggle to cover the full cost of college 
attendance; however, it is the dominant 
model when it comes to statewide free-
college programs. 
Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist, Michelle
Miller-Adams is a senior researcher, Brian Pittelko
is Promise research coordinator, and Bridget
Timmeney is a senior project consultant, all at the
Upjohn Institute. 
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